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Hydro-Politics: Water and Difficult 
Dialogues on Resources
Abdel Rahman Tamimi
I. Introduction
Water is considered the most important factor leading to instabil-
ity and conflict in the Middle East region. Recent analyses and reports 
point to the fact that the problem of water will get much more com-
plicated than current politics can handle. This is primarily because 
the problem is in conjunction with the natural features of the region: 
it is dry and desert terrain. Indeed, desert covers 60% of Israel, 70% of 
Syria, 85% of Jordan, and 90% of Egypt.
The Middle East also has one of the biggest alimentation gaps. Con-
sequently, agricultural expansion to bridge those gaps in the years to 
come will require large quantities of water, parallel to the highest aver-
age of population growth in the world.
To give an idea of the dimensions of the water problem in the Arab 
world: water requirements are calculated on a minimum basis known 
as the “Minimum Water Requirement” (MWR), which is 1,000 cubic 
meters/year (cm3/yr). The population of the Arab world is presently 
nearing 235 million. The quantity of available water per person is 
about 750 cm/yr, which is below the MWR. If the population reaches 
315 million by the year 2010, then a person’s share of water will drop 
to 575 cm3. If the average population growth is 25 per thousand, then 
the water requirement will reach 295 billion cm3 by the year 2010, i.e., a 
deficit of 120 billion cm3.
Israel’s water crisis in the 1990s constituted the foremost external 
threat to Arab water security. Israel’s inability to satisfy the rising water 
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needs of its settlements and agricultural projects has led it to try to 
control neighboring water sources. In addition, the Arab countries face 
a crisis with Turkey over the water of the Euphrates, as well as with the 
Ethiopian Nile projects.
The Palestinian-Israeli water problem is tied to Israel’s own water 
problem, on the one hand, and to Israeli political thought, on the other. 
Israeli political tradition in the area of water policy is confined to three 
basic axes. The first is the economic dimension, in which the agricul-
ture lobby is distinctly influential. For example, most of those who 
have held the position of general water commissioner came from agri-
cultural kibbutzim, and while agriculture consumes 73% of the total 
available water sources, its contribution to the Israeli gross national 
product does not exceed 3.7%.
The second axis is the Israeli horizontal and urban development in 
the 1970s, especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the absorption of huge numbers of immigrants. These people have 
come from countries where water shortages are virtually unknown. 
Consequently, their social activities and domestic habits utilize a large 
consumption of water not in keeping with Israeli water realities.
The third axis is Israel’s conception that the control of water sources 
by Palestinians carries an implication of sovereignty, especially with 
regard to the Jordan River and Palestinian water rights.
II. Geography and General Water Situation
The Palestinian Territory covers around 5719 square kilometers of land, 
plus 220 km2 of water. It is located on the east coast of the Mediterra-
nean Sea, west of Jordan and to the south of Lebanon. Israel, on the 
other hand, covers a total, 20,330 km2 of land, plus 440 km2 of water, 
reflecting armistice or cease-fire agreements with Lebanon and Syria, 
and more recent peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. The interna-
tional boundaries between Israel and Palestine have never been settled. 
The Green Line refers to the boundary established in the General Armi-
stice Agreement between Israel and Jordan on April 3, 1949.
The Palestinian Territory is characterized by limited surface and 
groundwater resources. The main surface water system in the region is 
the Jordan River Basin, which begins in three headwaters. The Hasbani 
River originates in Lebanon and has at least parts of its flow in Leba-
non, with an average flow of 138 mcm3/yr. The Dan and Banias (Nahal 
Hermon in Israel) Rivers originate in the Golan Heights and both flow 
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into the Jordan above Tiberius Lake, having average annual flows of 
245 and 121 mcm3, respectively. The Jordan River in sum has an aver-
age annual flow of 1300 mcm3. Significantly, the Jordan River Basin is 
considered by international law as an international river, with waters 
shared by Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine.
The groundwater system in Israel and Palestine is divided hydro-
logically into seven basins, each of which is subdivided into aquifers. 
The total annual renewable water from groundwater resources in both 
countries is 1454 mcm3/yr, of which at least 679 mcm3/yr derives from 
shared aquifers.
The Mountain Aquifer system comprises three sub-aquifers: the 
North-Eastern Mountain Aquifer Basin (NEMAB), the Western Moun-
tain Aquifer Basin (WMAB), and the Eastern Mountain Aquifer Basin 
(EMAB). The former two aquifers form part of an international hydro-
logic system that is shared with Israel. The EMAB has a special status 
with regard to the Palestinians. Almost 90% of the EMAB lies within 
the West Bank and is fed by recharge originating in the West Bank 
highlands. Accordingly, for the Palestinians, this aquifer is considered 
endogenous and should not be part of any negotiations with Israel 
over water. However, referring to internationally recognized classifica-
tions of trans-boundary aquifers, the EMAB is part of an international 
system, namely, the Jordan River Basin. The EMAB is hydrologically 
connected with the Jordan River Basin in some areas and it lies in the 
upstream portion of the rivers and feeds into the river. The status of 
this aquifer must be dealt due attention and care, especially when 
negotiating the Palestinian share in the waters of the Jordan River 
Basin.1
The Gaza Strip depends primarily on groundwater for its water sup-
ply. This high dependence has led to excessive exploitation of the Gaza 
Aquifer, which underlies the whole of the Gaza Strip. Studies indicate 
that 120–130 mcm3/year is pumped from the Gaza Aquifer compared 
to 60 mcm3 of annual natural replenishment. Furthermore, due to its 
proximity to the coast, the aquifer’s fresh water has been increasingly 
replaced by seawater. Together, this represents a serious threat to the 
present and future groundwater sustainability in Gaza.2
Wadi Gaza, on the other hand, is the only form of runoff that exists 
in the Gaza Strip. The Wadi is 160 km long and 1.5–3.0 m depth in 
some areas. The Wadi is considered a trans-boundary watercourse 
with Israel, as it originates in the Hebron Mountains in the West Bank, 
crosses the Green Line passing through Israel, then crosses the ter-
Macalester International  Vol. 23
142
ritory of the Gaza Strip to eventually reach its final destination, the 
Mediterranean Sea. Israel, which lies midway on this Wadi, has been 
constructing dams and water traps that result in diminishing the run-
off inside the Gaza Strip. Currently the Wadi has zero runoff. Further-
more, it became a waste disposal site and an environmental and health 
hazard.3
III. Israeli Water Policy and Practices: 
Impact on Palestine’s Development
A great deal has already been written about the historical evolution of 
the Arab-Israeli water conflict, beginning in the early 1900s, with the 
overwhelming majority of authors and researchers agreeing that water 
has always been considered an important strategic element in terms of 
Israeli policies, plans, and regional development. Many would state 
that the roots of the Arab-Israeli water conflict can be traced back to 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Under this document, which divided the 
regions of the Middle East between British and French control, no 
direct mention was made of water rights. The Sykes-Picot Agreement 
(1916) would most certainly have left the watersheds in the region 
divided in a most convoluted manner: the Litany and Jordan head-
waters just south of the Huleh region would have come under French 
control, while the Lake Tiberius area would have been split into two, 
with one part coming under international control and the other under 
French control. The Yarmouk Valley, meanwhile, would have come 
under both British and French control, while the lower stem of the Jor-
dan River would have found itself under international control on the 
West Bank and British control on the East Bank.
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the West further manipulated the 
affairs of the Middle East in order to first control the resources of the 
region and then to create a Jewish homeland in an area long considered 
central to Arab nationalism. However, despite having been promised a 
“national home” by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the Zionists were 
displeased with the land and water resources granted to the Jews by 
the British in 1919. Consequently, they embarked upon acquiring land 
as Israeli property in order to promote agricultural colonization based 
on Jewish labor.
The following sections of the essay summarize how Israel’s policies 
and plans were centered on the region’s water resources, and what 
impact these policies have on the status of, and prospects for, Pales-
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tine’s development. This will be done with reference to three major 
periods in time: 1948–1967, 1967–1992, and finally 1992 to the present.4
A. Between 1948–1967
A special United Nations Committee on Palestine provided evidence 
showing that Israelis owned only 7% of the land prior to the estab-
lishment of the state of Israel in 1948, whereas following the creation 
of the state, the percentage rose to 60%. Also noteworthy is the fact 
that following the establishment of the state, the main objective of the 
water plan was to divert as much water as possible outside the Jordan 
River Basin into a central conduit leading through the coastal plain up 
to the northern Negev. Since 1955, Israel has tapped into the WMAB. 
The National Water Carrier, which was first operated in 1964, was 
consequently the outcome of many years of planning, the first stages of 
which were implemented in 1948.
B. Between 1967–1992
Between 1967 and September 1992, the utilization of groundwa-
ter within the Occupied Palestinian Territories was governed solely 
by Israeli legislation and military orders. Today it relies on the three 
aquifers comprising the Mountain Aquifer, which combined provide 
approximately 40% of Israel’s water supply. Of the total of some 679 
mcm/yr of water annually available from the Mountain Aquifer, Israel 
currently uses about 483 mcm/yr, while the Palestinians are limited 
to about 118 mcm/yr. It is estimated that another 78 mcm/yr may be 
available after further exploitation in the Eastern Aquifer. Due to the 
fact that the Palestinians have consistently been denied access to their 
share of the Jordan River waters, and the massive imbalance in terms 
of current water-use rights, there is a huge imbalance in water con-
sumption. The Palestinian domestic per capita consumption of 35–80 
l/day is far below the standard established by the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO), i.e., a minimum of 100 l/day, while Israeli per capita 
consumption exceeds 300 l/day. Israel, it should be mentioned, has 
additional sources of fresh water. As well as the 600 mcm3/yr of water 
from the Jordan River it is currently utilizing, it also has access to water 
originating from another five groundwater aquifers located within its 
territory. As to the Palestinians’ access to water, up until 1995, only a 
very few drilling and extraction licenses were granted to enhance the 
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supply within Palestinian communities, which meant that the natural 
increase in water demand due to population growth and industrial 
and agricultural expansion had to be satisfied from the wells that had 
already existed prior to the occupation.5
On the water services level, the existing water supply networks in 
almost all the West Bank and Gaza Strip are old, with some dating back 
more than 50 years. During the last 34 years of occupation, no planned 
maintenance or rehabilitation took place due to the limited financial 
and technical capacities of facilities of the local authorities that were 
in charge of water services. Additionally, Israel is the one that grants 
permission to conduct maintenance work. This situation has led to 
high loss percentages through pipe leakage, as unaccounted for water 
reaches a value of 50% in some of the municipalities.
Finally, and most importantly, during the past years Israel has devel-
oped its technical and legal knowledge and capacity in the field of 
water resources management and regulation. The Palestinians, on the 
other hand, had limited opportunities to develop similar capacities. 
The range of military orders and restrictions imposed on the Palestin-
ians concerning the development of water resources contributed to the 
creation of a serious asymmetry between the parties.
C. Between 1992 and the Present
After long years of struggle, the Palestinians and Israelis began negoti-
ations formally in 1992. One aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 
has been to establish a Palestinian interim self-autonomy that would 
not exceed three years, and that would lead to a permanent settle-
ment based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Within 
the framework of the Middle East Peace Process, the government of 
the state of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
signed the “Declaration of Principles” (DOP) in September 1993. The 
DOP was the first initiative showing the willingness by both parties to 
put an end to the decades of confrontation and live in peaceful coex-
istence. The “Gaza-Jericho” Agreement was signed between the PLO 
and the state of Israel regarding the autonomous rule of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) in Jericho and the Gaza Strip on May 4, 1994.
In 1995, the government of the state of Israel and the PLO entered 
into an interim agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Both 
parties showed a desire for putting into effect the DOP. They also reaf-
firmed their recognition of mutual legitimacy and political rights. The 
Abdel Rahman Tamimi
145
water situation was among the contentious issues that were delayed 
until the final status negotiations. Only temporary solutions were 
offered for the water crises in Palestine within the interim period. To 
date, only minimum progress has been achieved to fulfil the promised 
commitments.6
On 30 April 2003, the United States presented the “road map” for 
peace in the Middle East to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and 
newly confirmed Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, with 
the intention of solving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. 
Together with the European Union (EU), the U.N., and Russia, the U.S. 
defined the road map destination as “a final and comprehensive settle-
ment of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005.” The settlement negoti-
ated between the parties would (they hoped), “result in the emergence 
of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian State living side 
by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours.”
During 2003, Israel commenced the construction of a “separation 
fence,” designed to cut the access of people in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. This fence, which follows the 1967 Green Line, crosses into 
Palestinian land by up to 6 kilometres in places—and restricts access 
by landowners from farming their own land. On completion it will 
entirely encircle the West Bank. The West Bank and Gaza will not be 
able to form a viable sovereign state.7
IV. Description of the Causes of Jordan River Basin Crises
It is necessary to have a precise idea of the causes of the water cri-
sis afflicting the area. When looking at the Jordan Basin as a whole, 
the first element that strikes the observer is undoubtedly the natural 
water scarcity characterizing the area. This extreme paucity of avail-
able resources, both of surface water (Jordan, Yarmuk, minor tributar-
ies) and underground water (Coastal Aquifer, Mountain Aquifer, and 
so on) represents the first fundamental cause of the regional water cri-
sis. In addition, water resources are asymmetrically distributed among 
riparian states, and per capita consumption levels are extremely vari-
able. Two states in particular, Syria and Lebanon, while being depen-
dent on Jordan water sources on a local basis, have huge available 
water reserves in the remaining part of their territories (the Litani 
River in Lebanon, the Euphrates and Oronte in Syria). This represents 
a potential solution to their present-day water crisis, whereas Israel, 
Jordan, and the Palestinian Territories are entirely dependent upon the 
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scarce resources of the Jordan Basin. Even inside this smaller group, 
there are significant differences relating to water consumption levels 
and availability. Israel, for historical reasons, benefits from preferential 
access to the resources of the Basin (Jordan, Yarmuk, West Bank aqui-
fers) and is the sole riparian area where water consumption levels are 
comparable to those of Western countries. Yet it is not only a matter 
of control over resources, but also of efficient use and investment in 
modern water technologies and infrastructure. On this specific aspect, 
Israel can teach important lessons, not only to its regional partners, but 
also to many industrialized countries.
The second striking element is the centrality of agriculture in the 
economies of all the countries in the area. As a matter of fact, agricul-
ture absorbs 67%–95% of the available water resources in the Basin. 
The regional water crisis, then, is not only a matter of natural scarcity, 
but also of allocation of available water resources in favor of water-
intense activities with limited economic value. The choice of adequate, 
water-saving crops adapted to arid climates could represent an impor-
tant step in reducing consumption levels.
The third significant element in the water crisis is the persistence 
of high demographic trends characterizing all riparian countries. As 
the demand for water increases with population growth, the crisis 
becomes more intense and compelling.
The allocation to co-riparian underpinning the Johnston plan of 30 
September 1955 is annotated below.
Table 1. Compiled different versions of Johnston plan (Phillips et al., 2006)
Country total Jordan river
Diversion stream depletion
Lebanon   35   35   23
Syria  132  132   93
Jordan    7201  447  477
Israel    6162    4663  463
Total 1503 1110 1056
Saline water 28   28
1includes 243 mcm of local water
2includes 150 mcm of local water
3may be larger as long as stream depletion values govern
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V. Summary of Water Resources in Dispute
Table 2. Water Demand in the Region by 2020.
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VI. Description of Water Conflict
A. What History Can Teach Us
The question now is what are the human dynamics and political choices 
that have led to the present situation? We don’t have enough space 
here to fully discuss the complex role played by water resources in the 
long history of the Holy Land. What we can do is attempt to acquire 
some “useful lessons” from the experience of interactions among ripar-
ian states. First of all, access to, and control over, the water resources 
of the Basin have historically constituted a fundamental question for 
the peoples of the area, and figured highly in the political agenda of all 
the leaders over time. This is true for France and Great Britain, which 
immediately after World War I tried to include the most important 
water sources of the Basin inside the borders of their respective “Man-
dates.” This is true for the Zionist movement, which was aware that 
the settlement strategy of Jewish communities in the semi-desert land 
of Palestine couldn’t succeed without an adequate amount of water 
resources for agriculture. And this is true as well for the Arab popula-
tions living in Palestine at that time, which repeatedly expressed their 
concern over the establishment of new communities in a water-scarce 
land, fearing it would place a huge burden on their own future pros-
pects for economic development. In the same way, during the 1950s 
and ’60s, all Basin states undertook huge efforts to unilaterally exploit 
the portion of Basin resources under their control, in an attempt to 
grant themselves a basis for the development of their economies. These 
contrasting efforts inevitably resulted in a drastic rise in regional ten-
sion, as in the case of the digging of the East Ghor Canal by Jordan or 
the construction of the Israeli National Water Carrier, which was a cru-
cial project for the consolidation of the young Jewish State (in reaction 
to which its Arab neighbors elaborated the well-known deviation plan 
of the Jordan River springs).
Secondly, the water issue has always been interlinked with other 
core issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as the recognition of the 
Jewish state, the rights of the Palestinian people, borders, settlements, 
and the reintegration of refugees. Despite the importance of the water 
issue in the perceptions of the parties involved, water itself has never 
been the only cause or the direct target of the military confrontations 
that occurred in the history of Middle East conflict. As a matter of fact, 
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water has acquired a strategic value because of the general context of 
conflict, not vice versa.
Finally, it is worthy of further notice that the parties were neverthe-
less able to recognize, on specific occasions and under certain condi-
tions, the important potential for cooperation intrinsically connected to 
the water issue. The most significant among these conditions seems to 
have been the active involvement of a third party.
In conclusion, during all the pre-Madrid period, before the begin-
ning of the peace process in the area, any development of inter-state 
cooperation regarding water resources was hampered by the existence 
of a radical conflict involving fundamental political issues, such as 
sovereignty over territory and mutual recognition—without a strategic 
commitment by the parties in favor of peace and mutual recognition. 
The occasional low-level technical cooperation on water issues contrib-
uted to détente relations between the opposing parties only in a very 
marginal way.
B. Bilateral Negotiation and the Main Claims of the Parties
From this perspective, the launch of the Peace Process at the beginning 
of the ’90s has represented a major turning point. The process laid the 
foundation for a mutual recognition of the needs and rights of the par-
ties, thus unlocking a dialogue on the whole of the historical conten-
tious issues, including that of water resources.
On the Israeli-Palestinian track, the Madrid Process led to the full 
recognition of Israel by the PLO and, at the same time, to the recogni-
tion of the rights of the Palestinians in the field of water resources. The 
signing of the Taba Agreements in 1995 marked a significant develop-
ment, although the nature and measure of these rights is still to be 
determined. Is it a “right to a certain amount of resources” or a recog-
nition of “sovereign rights” over them? The settlement of this issue has 
been put aside for the moment, and will be part of the comprehensive 
package defining the final status of the Palestinian Territories. In the 
meantime, a partial reallocation of the resources in favor of the Pales-
tinians has been accomplished, while the PNA has agreed to take part 
in joint management activities with Israel.
The core issue at the heart of talks on the Israeli-Syrian track of the 
Peace Process was the possible handing over of the Golan Heights. 
Talks came to a standstill just when a solution to the water conflict was 
at hand, based on the formula “restitution of land to Syria versus Syr-
Macalester International  Vol. 23
150
ian guarantees on usage of water sources” (Banyas springs, Yarmuk, 
Upper Jordan), upon which Israel is dependent. With the prospect 
of the reopening of the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, this basic formula 
should be resumed and further detailed by the parties. They might 
complement it with a mechanism for joint control of trans-boundary 
effects of upstream water use, and possibly with rules on joint manage-
ment of shared resources.
On the Lebanese-Israeli front, after the complete fading out of the 
historical dispute over the Litani River, tensions and concerns have 
resurfaced over potential negative trans-boundary effects of Hasbani 
River use on the Lebanese side of the border. So far, Lebanon has cho-
sen not to discuss any form of joint management of the river, with the 
complete normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel as a precon-
dition for cooperation in the field of water. This suggests that a serious 
negotiating effort on Israel’s “Northern Front” could greatly contribute 
to the solution of the pending water issues. The achievement of the sin-
gle and most important diplomatic success in the region, namely the 
Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel (which includes an important 
chapter on partition, and joint management and development of shared 
water sources), was indeed fostered by the absence of significant con-
nections between the water conflict and other potential divisive issues 
(such as mutual recognition, border disputes, or the refugee problem). 
This allowed the negotiating teams to concentrate on the solution to 
the water conflict without any “interference” from other items on the 
agenda, and to eventually reach a mutually beneficial compromise.
The Peace Treaty reaffirms the fundamental principles of equitable 
use, no harm, joint management, and joint development through the 
institution of a Joint Committee charged with the task of elaborating 
plans and proposals for the solution of the water problem in the long 
term.
C. Four Lessons Learned from Peace Talks
While bilateral talks focused on the most pressing issues of concern 
to single pairs of countries, the multilateral track was conceived by 
the architects of the Peace Process as an opportunity to look at the 
future of the Middle East as a unitary region, with the aim, inter alia, of 
elaborating sustainable solutions to the long-term problems of protec-
tion and development of the regional water potential. The Multilateral 
Working Group on Water Resources was created as one of the five 
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working groups that constituted the architecture of the multilateral 
talks. It met several times between 1992 and 2000. Unfortunately, the 
progress of talks in this group was undermined by a series of obstacles 
of an intrinsically political nature. The most striking problem was the 
refusal by both Lebanon and Syria to take part in the meetings, which 
limited the scope of potential cooperation to only three countries and 
didn’t allow it to consider the entire Jordan Basin system, including its 
tributaries and springs.
In addition, each party showed different priorities on the items to 
be included in the multilateral agenda. Israel tried to convince its part-
ners to focus on the elaboration of plans to optimize the use of existing 
water resources, and eventually to resort to alternative sources (e.g., 
via desalination).
On the other side, Arab states—the Jordanian and Palestinian del-
egations in particular—strove hard to include the highly political ques-
tions of redistribution of available water resources and the definition 
of water quotas to be attributed to each riparian state, considering 
them preconditions to any form of technical cooperation. Again, the 
old problem of the interaction between “low politics” (such as techni-
cal cooperation in the field of water) and “high politics” (in which the 
determination of water rights is connected with the fundamental prob-
lems of statehood, borders, and refugees) resurfaced in the context of 
the multilateral meetings, de facto blocking progress. It is nevertheless 
necessary to recognize that a limited number of initiatives originally 
elaborated and discussed in the context of the multilaterals were later 
added to the agenda of bilateral peace talks, as the parties agreed to 
institutionalize their cooperation. One example is the project of a canal 
from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea, which was later developed 
by Israel and Jordan on a bilateral basis after the signing of the Peace 
Treaty.
In conclusion, the multilateral initiatives have indeed played a piv-
otal role in keeping the dialogue among the parties alive. Regardless, it 
is impossible to achieve decisive results without courageous and even 
painful acts of political will that demonstrate the parties’ commitment 
to attain a comprehensive and lasting peace.
1. The Bilateral Negotiations
The essence of the bilateral rounds of talks about water is contained 
in Article 40, within the framework of the general Palestinian-Israeli 
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agreement signed in Taba on September 18, 1995. This article contains 
basic points and headings that might prove useful for future action, but 
it has no bearing on mechanisms for a radical solution to the problem. 
That is why what has been achieved in Article 40 contains a number 
of positive points, provided these are implemented according to the 
Palestinian understanding of them. However, a great divergence exists 
between the Israeli and Palestinian understanding of the agreement, 
which, in certain clauses, are diametrically opposed.
The following table shows the extent of the discrepancy between the 
two sides, even concerning basic issues:
Thus, the lack of clarity is among the obstacles to the implementa-
tion of the basic agreement. In addition, the Article does not provide 
for a mechanism leading to a total resolution of the water problem. It is 
also an escape from basic issues, such as the definition of the meaning 
of “rights” and “control,” nor does it refer to the problem of the Jordan 
River.
Furthermore, a basic drawback of the Agreement is the fact that 
it retained the formulation of the Gaza-Jericho agreement, signed in 
August 1994, which, from a technical perspective, has a bad reputa-
tion among Palestinian experts. This is due to several reasons: water 
allocation for settlers stayed as is; the water sources in the Gaza Strip 
remained subject to available information on the water of settlements; 
and the water supply problem continued to be confined to a com-
mercial dimension based on the concessions for the Israeli water com-
pany.8
Subject Degree of Clarity 
in Agreement
Israeli 
Understanding
Palestinian 
Understanding
Water rights General and 
ambiguous
To be negotiated Water rights 
are ﬁ xed
Water prices Unclear Commercial 
basis
Not crystallized
Function of joint 
commi ee
Complicated 
details
Has extensive 
powers
Has limited 
powers
Responsibility 
for sources
Unclear Israeli Palestinian
Responsibility 
for supply
Clear Joint Joint-Palestinian
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2. The Multilateral Negotiations
The formation of a water committee within the framework of multilat-
eral negotiations attests to the importance of this subject in bolstering 
the peace process, as well as in achieving people’s aspirations to com-
fort and economic prosperity in the region.
Progress in multilateral negotiations is directly connected with 
progress on the bilateral track. This is especially so because, according 
to Palestinian understandings, the issue of water is primarily politi-
cal. Multilateral negotiations are conceived as an academic exercise of 
technical use, but they lack the competence to advance a solution to the 
essence of the water problem.
Most of the discussions of the water committees have, so far, been 
confined to a technical framework, revolving around four subjects: the 
means for the exchange of technical information among the countries 
of the region, the means for developing water resources and water 
administration, regional cooperation, and joint administration.
Their technical nature not withstanding, it should be noted that the 
Palestinians view multilateral negotiations as an acceptable procedure 
from a psychological perspective, because they entail sitting together 
with other parties and arriving at a mutual understanding. The 
absence of Syria and Lebanon from these talks, however, has hindered 
this understanding. Thus another formula has to be found that can be 
updated to ensure the participation of both these countries. Moreover, 
an update of the multilateral agenda will help extricate them from 
their academic nature in order to tackle problems of essence.
VII. The General Framework for Negotiations over Water 
in the Final-Status Talks
What gains or losses that have been achieved through this Agreement 
are immaterial at this point. What is important now is to find a general 
framework for negotiations about a final settlement for the problem of 
water. That is why it is necessary to lay down the main components 
of a Palestinian strategy for negotiations in the final stage, before the 
delineation of any technical framework:
•  The issue of Palestinian water rights, especially regarding the Jordan 
River, is one of political sovereignty, and a major feature of a future 
state. It is not only a question of water shares.
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•  A solution to the water problem is pressing not only to the Palestin-
ians but to the Israelis as well: they both face a water crisis. Indeed, 
this is a weak point on the Israeli side. The lack of a solution to the 
problem constitutes, in itself, a problem for the Israelis (some weak 
points will be listed later).
•  Any agricultural development within the framework of an infra-
structure for the Palestinian people is contingent upon the extent of 
control over water sources.
•  No separation, in any form, should exist between negotiations on 
water sources and distribution systems.
•  Negotiations, in any form, should be according to the hydrological 
distribution of the sources and not according to geographical/politi-
cal areas.
•  The unrestricted determination of present and future water needs of 
the Palestinian people, taking into consideration the various socio-
logical and economic scenarios.
•  The principle of cooperation should be dealt with at a later stage 
rather than at the beginning of negotiations.
VIII. The General Technical Framework for 
Negotiating Mechanisms
The shape of a square can form the starting point for a negotiating 
mechanism over the issue of water. One side represents the future 
needs in water, agriculture, politics, etc. The second side represents the 
Palestinian water policy to be adopted. The third side is the principle 
of sovereignty over land and water, and the fourth, which closes the 
square, is the capacity for shared cooperation with all other parties on 
the basis of parity.
From the vantage point of this square, it is easy to visualize the 
general mechanism for negotiations for final status. It rests on defining 
the strategic objectives for negotiations over this vital sector. Conse-
quently, the general guidelines, or the “technical guidelines,” for this 
strategy are as follows:
•  To cancel all military orders pertaining to water, as well as the con-
cessions to the Mekorot company.
•  To provide a clear and focused definition of the concepts of the 
agreement.
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•  The Jordan River is the political border of the state of Palestine and 
it is a shared and international water source.
•  To deal with water sources as one hydrological unit.
•  Not to separate the issue of water and other issues, such as the envi-
ronment and natural resources.
•  Pan independent water policy for each side, and not to integrate the 
region’s water policy as though it were homogeneous.
•  To avoid copying ready-made models for the administration of 
water sources from other parts of the world. Indeed, the major flaw 
of Article 40 resides in its vagueness and flexibility relating to the 
commitments expected on the Israeli side, and its preciseness where 
the Palestinians’ commitments are concerned.
•  To avoid as much as possible the formation of joint committees.
In light of the above, the following table presents suggestions for 
a proposal for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations over the major water 
issues.
Degree of Commitment Mechanism
Mekorot concession Absolute A timetable for ending the 
concession
Partnership in the 
Jordan River
Absolute With the speciﬁ cation of 
timetable and quantities
The west and 
north basin
Absolute Without timetable
Joint administration Relative Deﬁ nition of speciﬁ c 
concepts
In summary, in negotiations it is incumbent on the Palestinian side 
to talk about principles and not to drown in details of numbers. It 
should be noted here that we are talking about an independent state, 
with sovereignty over its national waters, and with the capacity for 
joint cooperation in what will be defined as international waters.
IX. Conclusion
In the peace negotiation process on the question of the shared water 
resources in the Middle East, the partners to the dispute will have to 
give serious consideration to ways of applying the principles of the 
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Helsinki Rules. These must include a formula of equitable apportion-
ment and eventual joint monitoring, inspection, and control on both 
sides of the border. A bold and generous water-for-peace plan can not 
only remove an important obstacle, but can provide a real motivation 
for peace that will enable the partners to the dispute to solve urgent 
problems for the social welfare and economic benefit of it. •
Notes
1. Abusaada 2005.
2. Daibes 2006, Personal communication.
3. Ibid.
4. Daibes 2005, Personal communication; and Tamimi 2003.
5. Daibes 2005, Personal communication.
6. Daibes 2006, Personal communication.
7. Ibid.
8. Mekorot Water Company Ltd.
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